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Emerging Gray Market Balance:
A Global Perspective on Solutions
for the Nineties
by TIMOTHY P. RUMBERGER*
Introduction
Advanced communications and transport systems have em-
powered twentieth century multinational corporations to man-
ufacture, distribute and market consumer products globally.1
In the wake of these international lines of distribution, a bur-
geoning network of "parallel" trading2 has emerged to compete
with "established" dealer channels.3
Annually importing billions of dollars in trademarked goods4
* Timothy P. Rumberger, a May 1989 J.D. candidate at Hastings College of the
Law, currently externs for United States District Court Judge Marilyn Hall Patel in
the Northern District of California. In the field of international economics, Mr.
Rumberger served at the White House on the Presidential Commission on World
Hunger under President Carter from 1979-80, and completed further study abroad on
the East Asia Study Program in Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong, and the Peoples
Republic of China. He studied business and economics at both the University of Call.
fornia at Berkeley and Wheaton College, Illinois, where he received his B.A. in 1983.
1. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988) [hereinafter COPL4T III].
See also Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Parfumes
Stern, Inc. v. United States Customs Service, 575 F. Supp. 416, 418 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
2. Parallel trade encompasses the far ranging network of independent distribu-
tors between producers and consumers which has emerged in the shadow of the tradi-
tional channels established by domestic trademark owners.
The term, widely used to describe the flow of gray market imports, is technically
inaccurate. While all genuine trademarked products enter the stream of commerce
from a common point of origin (the foreign factory), both the route and the specific
destinations of gray market imports rarely parallel the established channels. As will
be discussed, gray market routes often wind through third country wholesalers, di-
verted from foreign markets of intended distribution. Moreover, these secondary
routes usually extend beyond the realm of dealer showrooms to discount stores and
mail-order houses.
3. Nolan-Haley, The Competitive P oces and Gray Market Goods, 5 N.Y.L, ScH.
J. INT'L & CoMP. L 231 (1984).
4. N.Y. Times, June 1, 1988, at 1, col. 1. "Government and other experts say there
are no reliable statistics on the size of the gray market. Justice William Brennan Jr.'s
opinion [concurring in COPLAT III, decided May 31, 1988] called it a 'multibillion-dol-
lar industry' and an 'immense domestic retail industry.' Most estimates put it at be-
low $10 billion a year in total sales." Id at C6, col. 3.
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to the United States, these parallel distribution channels sup-
ply America's "gray market. '5 Worldwide sales of Mercedes,
Porsches and BMWs,6 Vivitar, Canon and Olympus cameras,7
Seiko and Cartier watches," Yves Saint Laurent perfumes,9 pre-
mium wines, 10 consumer electronics, and a multitude of other
trademarked goods emanate from foreign manufacturing facili-
ties. When consumer demand for such products has been de-
veloped in the United States," and their cost abroad (allowing
for shipping) is lower than it is domestically, an economic in-
centive develops for parallel import and discount sale to Ameri-
5. Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 317 (2d Cir. 1986), qff'g 627 F.
Supp. 911 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). "Gray market goods... are goods that are manufactured
abroad, are legally purchased abroad from authorized distributors, and are then im-
ported by persons other than the [domestic] trademark holder and without the [do-
mestic] markholder's permission." Id.; see J. THOMAS McCARTHY, 2 TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 30.35 (2d ed. 1984). "Generally gray market goods are
genuinely produced and trademarked goods that are sold outside of their authorized
distribution channels." I
6. Wholly-owned and produced by European parent corporations, American sub-
sidiaries hold the American trademarks; see 2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 265 (Feb. 20,
"1985); Shiver, Auto Gray Market Takes Off, L.A. Times, Dec. 30, 1984, at V1, col. 2.
7. Olympus Corporation is a New York wholly-owned subsidiary of Olympus Op-
tical Company, Ltd., the Japanese parent company. Olympus Corp. v. United States,
792 F.2d 315, 317 (2d Cir. 1986). Vivitar, on the other hand, is a California corporation,
licensing wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries to apply the Vivitar trademark to the
equipment manufactured abroad. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1556
(Fed. Cir. 1985).
8. Cartier, Inc. is wholly owned by a Dutch parent company; Averbach, The Gray
Market- Where a $200 Watch Can Be Bought For $140, Wash. Post, Dec. 16, 1984, at
L1, col. 1; Seiko Time Corp. v. Alexander's, Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 560 (S.D.N.Y.
1982).
9. Charles of the Ritz Group, Ltd., which holds the American license to Yves
Saint Laurent fragrances, is owned by the French parent company Yves Saint Lau-
rent, S.A. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., No. 86-495, 47th Street Photo, Inc. v.
Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks, No. 86-624, United
States v. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks, No. 86-625, -
U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 950 (1988) [hereinafter C0PIATII], restored to calendar for reargu-
ment on the merits. I& at 960, Brief for Petitioner K Mart Corp. at 6.
10. "Gay Market" Ruling Expected to Stabilize Prices, N.Y. Times, June 1, 1988,
at C6, col. 4. Joe Politz, owner of D & M Wine and Liquor, a San Francisco store that
sells quantities of champagne at a discount and often buys on the gray market, pre-
dicted that prices would be lower as a result of the United States Supreme Court
ruling in COPIATILI. "He said he could sell a bottle of Dom Perignon champagne for
$55, compared with $80 for retailers who buy through authorized United States dis-
tributors." Id See also Wolinsky, Bill to Curb Bargain Sales Qf Prestige Foreign
Wines Gains, LA. Times, Aug. 22, 1985, at 23, col. 1; 30 Pat. Trademark & Copyright
J. (BNA) 657 (Oct. 24, 1985).
11. Consumer demand typically pre-exists parallel import. For a discussion of its
development see infra notes 35-44 and accompanying text.
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can consumers.
12
Numerous articles, judicial opinions, executive reports, and
legislative proposals have been written throughout the past six-
and-a-half decades in response to this controversial phenome-
non. President Reagan appointed an interagency task force to
study the issues.13 State legislatures in New York 14 and Cali-
fornia' 5 have recently adopted regulations to protect consumers
from gray market confusion. On May 31, 1988, the United
States Supreme Court narrowly ruled in favor of allowing
lower priced parallel imports for consumers, eschewing greater
protection of domestic trademark owners from unwanted gray
market competition.'6 Two federal bills now in committee, al-
ternatively propose codification of previously existing Customs
restraints, 7 or blanket exclusion of parallel imports.18
Amidst the fracas of partisan debate, genuine concern has fo-
cused on consumer protection issues, trademark values and ar-
guably ambiguous statutory language. Proponents of gray
markets are quick to dismiss legitimate concerns raised by
trademark owners as self-serving smoke screens for gouging
the American public, while gray market opponents label the
fears proclaimed by consumer groups and importers as short-
sighted and ill-informed.
For the most part, too little attention has been focused on the
market forces which cause parallel importation. 9 What is ab-
sent from the discussion is a comprehensive synthesis of the
12. Coalition To Preserve the Integrity Of American Trademarks v. United
States, 790 F.2d 903, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1986) [hereinafter COPIAT I].
13. The Working Group on Intellectual Property, comprised of officials from the
Office of Management and Budget, the Council of Economic Advisors, the Treasury
Department, the Commerce Department, the State Department, the Justice Depart-
ment and the U.S. Trade Representative, was created to consider options and recom-
mend solutions to the Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade. See Beyers, The
Greying of American Trademarks The Genuine Goods Exclusion Act and the Incon-
gruity Qf Customs Regulation 19 C.FR § 133.21, 54 FORDHAM L REv. 83, 88 (1985).
14. Assembly Bill No. 5971 (effective Oct. 22, 1985); see also N.Y. Times, June 22,
1985, at 52, col. 1.
15. Assembly Bill No. 2735; see also Discount Store News, Nov. 10, 1986, at 15, col.
1.
16. COPIAT III, 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988). Justice Anthony Kennedy, who joined the
Court February 18, 1988, wrote the lead opinion in the case which the Court had or-
dered reargued after apparently having deadlocked 4 to 4 in its initial vote before his
arrival. See Taylor, High Court Backs Selling Qf Imports on "Gray Market," N.Y.
Times, June 1, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
17. S. 1097, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 65 CONG. REC. S5524 (1987).
18. S. 1671, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. 11893 (1987).
19. Miller, Restricting the Grey Market in Trademarked Goods: Per Se Legality,
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causes, symptoms, and competing interests, together with a re-
alistic plan to enhance trademark values, minimize import
risks and encourage economic growth.
This Note suggests a solution to the problems confronting
consumers lured by, and domestic trademark owners under-
mined by, parallel importation. It will: (1) consider the causes
and effects of the gray market among four competing groups
(consumers, manufacturers, domestic trademark owners, and
gray market importers); (2) examine the contemporary legisla-
tive, judicial, and executive approaches toward balancing these
interests; and (3) recommend a minimum regulation model
structured to maximize consumer welfare amidst currency
fluctuations, rigorously protect domestic intellectual property
values against degradation and infringement, facilitate con-
sumer access to information, provide incentives for manufac-
turer controls and investment, and ultimately strengthen the
economy.
I
Market Conditions Create a Demand for Gray
Market Goods
The gray market thrives where certain profitable conditions
develop, in local or worldwide markets, creating supplier incen-
tives and stimulating product demand. 0 When the U.S. dollar
is strong abroad, American retailers can save millions of dollars
in wholesale costs by independently purchasing the same trade-
marked merchandise from distributors overseas.2 '
Similar incentives for parallel imports develop where Ameri-
can retailers, having built a reputation for high quality and de-
pendable service, command a higher price for the confidence
they have established; this premium, however, inevitably
causes some shift in consumer demand to lower priced competi-
tors.22 Alternatively, more frugal consumers choose to search
for manufacturer trademarked "seconds" - made of the same
76 TRADEMARK REP. 363 (1986). "Most of the cases and articles do not deal (or do so
only superficially) with the economic aspects of gray markets." Id.
20. Cogglo, Gordon & Corruzi, The History and Present Status of Gray Goods, 75
TRADEMARK REP. 433,434 (1985). "In the last five years, the volume of gray goods has
increased dramatically due.., to the increased purchasing power of the United States
dollar." This effect is not new. Id.
21. See infra notes 25-34 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 35-48 and accompanying text.
[Vol. I0:I I0l1104
EMERGING GRAY MARKET BALANCE
quality components and sporting the prestigious label, but dis-
counted to compensate for minor imperfections.2 3 Still other
consumers, preferring to avoid the shopping jungle search for
bargains altogether, respond favorably to TV advertising, mail
order brochures, telephone, or door-to-door direct marketing.24
While government exclusion, private restraints, or litigation
by trademark owners may suppress or divert this trade, a long-
term solution to the problems of parallel importation will be
successful only to the extent that it recognizes the causes and
balances the impact of these economic forces.
A. International Currency Exchange Rate Fluctuations
The volume of gray market imports into the United States
has increased and decreased in relation to the relative value of
the dollar.25 These changes in the strength of the dollar re-
quire a chain of balancing adjustments in price and resource
allocation. Prudent business management decisions, however,
may delay adjustments in response to these exchange rate
fluctuations. e
To illustrate, despite the opportunity to buy overseas when
the dollar is strong, an individual camera boutique owner may
be limited by inventory space, contracts she has already made
with suppliers, or lack of extra money to buy the extra inven-
tory. Similarly, a multinational enterprise may be limited by
factory output constraints, barriers to entry such as tariff con-
trols, or long-run marketing considerations. The resulting de-
lays in response create a void of potential profits that could be
made by strategically positioned wholesalers.27 To fill this void,
23. See infra notes 49-7 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 74-86 and accompanying text
25. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, ECONOMIC EFFECTS
OF PARALuL IMPORT& A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS (1985). See also The Assault on the
Right to Buy Cheap Imports, FORTUNE, Jan. 7, 1985, at 89 (rising dollar has led to an
increase in gray market imports); Dollar Drop Drubs Grey Marketeers, Wash. Post,
May 4, 1986, at F3, col. 3 (declining dollar has significantly reduced grey market
imports).
26. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, BUREAUS OF COMPETITION, CONSUMER PRO-
TECTION & ECONOMICS, COMMENTs ON GRAY MARKET POLICY OPTIONS FACING THE
UNITED STATES CUSTOMS SERVICE, reprnted in 133 CONG. REC. S5525 (1987) [herein-
after FTC].
27. Where manufacturers have equalized prices internationally, gray markets
have largely disappeared. For example, uniform pricing of Michelin tires promptly
eliminated parallel imports. See Is the Gray Market Alive or Dead?, MOD. TIRE
DEALER, July 1986, at 17, cited in FTC, supra note 26, at S5530.
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a powerful class of professional arbitragers has emerged, moni-
toring exchange rate changes and positioning themselves with
sufficient capital and retail contacts to take advantage of result-
ing adjustment delays.28
This fact suggests a primary cause for the emergence of gray
markets: failure in the established channels to respond quickly
to currency fluctuations. A successful domestic approach to-
ward parallel importation must not ignore this market force or
its potential effect on consumer welfare.2
The effects of prohibiting parallel importation include higher
prices for consumers.s' If professional arbitragers are denied
access to American markets, the rise and fall of exchange rates
will automatically result in geographic price discrimination.
31
By maintaining domestic retail prices when the dollar is strong
abroad, dealers whose wholesale cost drops reap a windfall at
consumer expense.32 Parallel importation preserves price com-
petition, the market incentive to pass those savings on to con-
28. Failure of airlines to adjust ticket prices to reflect exchange rate changes
prompts the emergence of travel agencies that specialize in overseas ticket purchases
for U.S. travelers. See Travel Agents Woo Clients by Offering Rebates and Other
Money-Saving Deals, Wall St. J., Sept. 3,1986, at 29, col. 4; White, Air Fares On Gray
Market Offer Big Savings To Overseas Travelers, Wall St. J., Apr. 27, 1987, at 6, col. 4.
In fact, many trademarked goods are bought and sold in several currencies before
reaching the United States. See Camera Prices in a Shambles, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11,
1982, at 41, col. 3.
29. In a macroeconomic context, gray markets increase the rate of response to
changes in currency values. To the extent that such trade changes are necessary to
balance financial flows, rapid changes help to dampen exchange rate fluctuations. See
FTC, supra note 26, at S5529.
30. See '"ray Market" Ruling Eapected to Stablize Prices, N.Y. Times, June 1,
1988, at C6, Col. 2. "Joseph E. Antonini, chairman of the K Mart Corporation, the
nation's largest discounter, called the court decision [COPIATIII] 'a major ruling ben-
efiting consumers. It gives the gray-market product a legal legitimacy and will help
keep prices down for many products because of widened access of gray-market
goods.' I&
31. Supra note 26, at S5527. "[It is important to note that price discrimination
can produce greater harm to consumers in the international context .... When the
price discriminating firm is foreign, the profits from the price discrimination are
transferred out of the U.S. economy entirely." I&
32. Dealer windfall evaporates, however, when the dollar is weak; similarly, gray
market imports significantly decline. That the parallel phenomenon does not disap-
pear entirely when the dollar drops, supports the claim that gray market importation
has additional, independent causes. N.Y. Times, June 1, 1988, at C6, col. 5 (quoting
Nathan Lewin, the Washington attorney who argued the COPIAT III case for 47th
Street Photo in the Supreme Court, "the gray market continues even though the dol-
lar has fallen," although "the fall of the dollar means that you are not buying the
product in the foreign market at such a great differential from the price in the Ameri-
can market.") I&
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sumers. 3 The danger, however, with eliminating gray market
import controls is depreciation of domestic intellectual prop-
erty values.34
B. Consumer Demand Developed By Domestic
Trademark Owners
Foreign manufacturersS and domestic trademark owners'
create consumer demand, which is a primary incentive for gray
marketers when choosing particular products for import.-"
That demand is developed primarily through long-term invest-
ments in market research,s advertising," promotions' and
33. COPLAT11, see supra note 9, Brief for Petitioner K Mart Corp. at 6. "K Mart
operates more than 2,000 discount department stores in the United States, purchasing
parallel imports because of their lower price and because many trademark owners
refuse to sell directly to price-competitive retailers including K Mart. K Mart sells
parallel imports to consumers at up to 40% less than the.., other foreign manufactur-
ers seek to maintain in the United States." Id.
See also "Gray Market" Ruling Expected to Stablize Prices, N.Y. Times, June 8,
1988, at C6, col. 4. In San Francisco, companies that sell gray market goods cheered
the ruling [COPIAT III] saying it would lead to more goods and lower consumer
prices. "We're going to get more aggressive," said Isaac Larian, president of ABC In-
ternational Traders. "[A] big market will open up." Id.
34. Trademark values are not jeopardized from arbitrage directly. In fact, domes-
tic trademark owners themselves may benefit from currency fluctuations by licensing
overseas manufacturers, as done by Vivitar Corporation of California. Rather, the
risk arises indirectly from gray market discounters undermining the customer base
built by established dealers, discussed infra notes 35-48 and accompanying text.
35. See Knoll, Gray-Market Imports: Causes, Consequences and Responses, 18 L. &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 145, 163 (1986). Manufacturers invest in research, development, pro-
duction and marketing. Id.
36. See Newman, The United States Customs Service's Regulation of Grey Market
Imports: Does it Preserve the Broad Protections Afforded by Section 526 of the Tariff
Act of 1930?, 5 DICK. J. INT'L L. 293, 303 (1987). Consumer demand results where
national distributors make large investments in marketing trademarked products.
37. R. OLIVER & R. COLLETT, ADVERTISING AT WORK ... IN THE MODERN MAR-
KET PLACE 12-13 (1976). Gray market importers rely on the demand already created
by brand advertising of trademark owners for a particular trademarked product.
38. COLLADO ASSOCIATES, INC., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF DIVERSION 13 (1984)
(prepared on behalf of COPIAT in response to Certain Importations Bearing Re-
corded U.S. Trademark; Solicitation of Economic Data, 49 Fed. Reg. 21,453 (1984)).
39. Atwood, Import Restrictions on Trade Merchandise - the Role of the United
States Bureau of Customs, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 301, 308 (1969). Gray market import-
ers get the benefit of free advertising in the American market.
40. Gilbert, Ludwig & Fortine, Federal Trademark Law and the Gray Market The
Need for a Cohesive Policy, 18 L. & POL INT'L Bus. 103, 111-12 (1986). To create
goodwill, trademark owners' investments may include launching campaigns, in-store
promotional activities, sales force training, counter and window displays, gift-with.
purchase programs, customer samples, trade show exhibits, sponsorship of sporting
events, research and development operations, models and packaging designs, inven-
1988] 1107
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training of sales representatives.4' These investments are
designed to create goodwill and profits, attracting and retaining
loyal customers through consistent quality and friendly, knowl-
edgeable service to purchasers of their cars, cameras, watches,
perfume or clothing.
The point is not that mark holders own a monopoly on
knowledge or friendliness. Rather, through such service con-
sumer demand is initially cultivated--and cultivated by the
early pioneers of the particular products prior to the emer-
gence of competition by gray marketers. By selecting genuine
trademarked items with developed reputations for quality and
reliable service, gray marketers "free-ride" on the prior invest-
ments of the domestic trademark owners.'4 These parallel im-
porters have not contributed to developing the consumer
demand through advertising and service on which they depend
when selecting particular trademarked products for import and
by which they benefit when entering the market. 3 While man-
ufacturer investments toward creating this demand may be
built into the wholesale price structure, no mechanism exists to
ensure that parallel importers pay their way. 4
tories, warranty and service, customer relations, training courses, product information
centers, product literature and owners' clubs.
41. Id. Gilbert, Ludwig & Fortine are attorneys with the firm of Covington &
Burling, which represent the Coalition To Preserve the Integrity of American Trade-
marks, an organization of companies and trade associations that oppose the gray
market.
42. Those who benefit from services without incurring the costs are often called
"free-riders" by economists. See J. HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPUCATIONS
561-65 (2d ed. 1980).
43. Once having entered the market, gray market distributors often invest greatly
in further developing consumer demand for the trademarked products they purvey.
For instance, 47th Street Photo takes out full-page advertisements in the Sunday New
York Times, as well as offering a 15-day repair or replacement warranty on every
item it sells. See Lewin, The Ten Commandments of Parallel Importation, 18 L. &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 217, 233 (1986).
44. The problem of free-riding in intrabrand competition is not unique to gray
marketers. Spillover effects from one brand's promotional efforts to another brand
are commonly recognized, for instance in the "cola wars." What is unique to the gray
market phenomena, however, is that the effect is more direct; brand advertising by
domestic trademark owners directly promotes the parallel importer's product recog-
nition without requiring any additional investment by the gray marketer and without
returning any additional retail premiums to the trademark owner. At the same time,
what Olympus can do for its "authorized" retailers, that Coke can't do to compensate
its dealers for the sales it "loses" to Pepsi is to build the advertising costs into the
production cost, either through increased wholesale prices or through manufacturer
"factory" rebates. See, e.g., Gray Market Hits Camera, Watch Sales, ADVERTISING
AGE, Aug. 15, 1983, at 3. Hasselblad camera company offered direct consumer rebates
for purchasers of "authorized" imported cameras.
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This fact suggests a second primary cause for the emergence
of gray markets: established demand for trademarked products
as a result of successful marketing efforts by trademark own-
ers. Workable approaches toward protecting the integrity of
domestic intellectual property values must recognize this mar-
ket force.
When parallel importers are permitted to free-ride on the
market development investments of established dealers, the
loss of exclusivity automatically results in lost sales and lower
profit margins. 5 This reduces the incentive to invest in quality
maintenance and customer services in order to be more price
competitive. 4
Whether consumer welfare is better served by dealer serv-
ices or lower prices will ultimately be determined by consum-
ers in the marketplace. 7 In any case, the investments
previously made in trademark reputation have produced the
goodwill currently enjoyed by trademark dealers. Risk of
goodwill erosion arises, however, not from lower prices but
from consumer deception or confusion which results where
parallel imports have hidden quality defects, undisclosed war-
ranty exclusions or are not parallel in fact, but are counter-
feit.48 Domestic trademark owners and consumers should be
protected from these risks. Moreover, the costs of guarding
against such risks should not be thrust upon their victims, do-
mestic trademark owners and consumers.
C. Intrabrand Quality Differences
The quality of trademarked goods sometimes varies, as with
45. See Knoll, supra note 35, at 160. "Each time the authorized distribution chan-
nel loses a sale to the unauthorized distribution channel, the trademark owner loses
its premium for providing a product of high and consistent quality." Id
46. Alternatively, depreciating returns on goodwill investments may signal trade-
mark owners to alter their investment strategies to account for "parallel reality" by
differentiating themselves from discounters, maintaining distinct goodwill on the ba-
sis of full product-lines, trained sales people, dependable full-service repair facilities,
or luxurious ambience. For an in-depth discussion of competitive pricing models, see
W. WENTZ, MARKETING 396 (1979).
47. See Fogel, Grey Goods Market and Modern International Commerce: A Ques-
tion of Free Trade, 10 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 308, 322 (1987). The court should not sub-
stitute its judgment for that of the consumer, as long as serious consumer protection
concerns do not exist. See also Mattioli, Resale Price Fixing and the 'Hi-Tech' Dis-
counter. Consumer Electronics in Madison, 14 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 11, 31
(1983).
48. For a discussion of the appropriate remedy for consumer protection concerns,
see infra notes 123-32 and accompanying text.
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any manufacturing process. Quality control at the manufac-
turer level thus creates a supply of "seconds." 49 Additionally,
products intended for retail in foreign markets, and designed to
different specifications than those intended for sale domesti-
cally, are sometimes "diverted" and sold through domestic re-
tailers by gray market importers °
Consumer demand for low-priced, trademarked "seconds"
and "diverted" products is well demonstrated by the spectacu-
lar success of discounters targeting such consumer markets,5 '
and by the growing number of "bargain basements"52 within
non-discount national department stores.a However, while
lower prices are sometimes the result of arbitrage,54 lack of ser-
vice,5 or low rent locations,m where the reason is inferior qual-
ity or warranty exclusions, consumers benefit only-if at all-
when aware of the inferiority at the time of purchase. 7 Thus,
49. "Seconds" generally refers to products slightly inferior to the quality standard
established by the manufacturer, but which the manufacturer finds more profitable to
sell in their imperfect condition at substantially reduced prices than to repair,
demark, or destroy; See El Greco Leather Prods. Co. v. Shoe World, Inc., 599 F. Supp.
1380, 1385-87, (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
50. Russell, In the Glare of the Rising Sun, TIME, Oct. 13, 1986, at 71 (soft drinks
intended for Far East sale often have additional sweeteners added); Conversion with
a Grey Marketeer, CONSUMER ELECTRONICS, July 1985, at 49 (cellular phones with
frequency variations incompatible for use in the United States); What Price Merce-
des?, FORBES, August 27, 1984, at 134.
51. Attention Shoppers! Discount Factory Outlets Turn San Francisco's South of
Market Into Retail District, San Francisco Examiner, Jan. 31, 1988, at D1, col. 2 ("A
South of Market bargain district-made up of some 25 factory outlets, five times the
number fifteen years ago-is drawing shoppers from as far as Anchorage to New
York." Id.). National chains such as K Mart, Marshall's and Ross, as well as a myriad
of small local retailers such as 47th Street Photo in New York demonstrate the con-
sumer demand for discount products.
52. Id. at D4, col. 3 (According to Sally Socolich, author of BARGAIN HUNTING IN
THE BAY AREA (6th ed. 1986), shoppers from the affluent to the financially strapped,
come in bus tours, carloads and on foot to rifle through leftover, damaged, or flawed
goods.).
53. E.g., Macy's, Bamberger's, and Emporium Capwell. Sears, Roebuck & Com-
pany, the nations largest retailer, does not sell gray market goods, however, as a mat-
ter of policy. See N.Y. Times, June 1, 1988, at C6, col. 3.
54. See White, Air Fares on Gray Market Offer Big Savings to Overseas Travelers,
Wall St. J., Apr. 27, 1987, at 6, col. 4. See also supra note 28 and accompanying text.
55. Supra note 51, at D4, col. 3. "You won't get the kind of service you'll find at
Nieman-Marcus." I&
56. Id. at D4, col. 2. "Despite the retail surge ... the district's property prices
haven't risen, primarily because most old warehouses aren't appropriate for conven-
tional stores. Dilapidated brick buildings, for instance, don't have large display win-
dows that department stores and boutiques desire." I&
57. In Selchow & Righter Co. v. Goldex Corp., 612 F. Supp. 19 (S.D. Fla. 1985), the
claimant demonstrated (through consumer complaints) the inferiority (i.e. consumer
1110
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the harms to consumer welfare and trademark goodwill arise
not from discounted prices, but where information regarding
the condition of gray market goods is not disclosed or available.
This problem is inherent to the parallel import equation be-
cause discount retailers lack market incentives to inform con-
sumers of these imperfections or differences in qualityM or
warranty coverage.59
Retailer success in the "seconds" market suggests a third
cause for the emergence of parallel importation: the constant
supply of slightly inferior trademarked products, compounded
by retailer nondisclosure of these quality variations.
The danger of parallel imports in this context is not that they
sometimes facilitate the distribution of inferior quality prod-
ucts or even that they divert products designed according to
foreign specification. Rather, this particular danger to trade-
mark owners and consumers arises from nondisclosure. Non-
disclosure of any inferior qualities of gray market products
prevents consumers from making meaningful choices and, nat-
urally, leads to lower quality expectations.' Foreign language
instructions accompanying diverted products particularly frus-
trate safe and proper consumer use. 1 Moreover, consumer
confidence in the quality of the trademark may also be
threatened where parallel imports lack adequate warnings and
safety standards,62 or when warranties advertised by "manufac-
turer authorized" dealers do not cover those products if
purchased through discounters.6 Consumers unaware of such
confusion) of gray market Canadian TRIVIAL PURSUIT games because the games'
questions were designed for the Canadian market, a fact unknown to purchasers at
the time of sale. Id. at 24.
58. Akerlof, The Market For "Lemons". Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
59. No Guarantees for Guarantees in Gray Market, Wall St. J., Feb. 5, 1985, at 33,
col. 3; see Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
60. FTC, supra note 26, at S5526. Consumer confusion about the actual character-
istics of gray market goods could potentially cause both immediate and long-term in-
jury to consumers and trademark owners. Immediate injury would result if
consumers paid for a characteristic that is not actually included. Longer term injury
would occur if consumers dissatisfied with gray market goods could not distinguish
higher quality authorized imports.
61. Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1168.
62. Diverted Oil of Olay Containing FD&C Red No.2 Recalled, FDC REPORTS, Toi-
LETRIES, FRAGRANCES, AND SKIN CARE, Oct. 22, 1984, at 7, cited and discussed in Gil-
bert, Ludwig & Fortine, supra note 40, at 110.
63. Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1167.
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exclusions will likely be confused, as well as disappointed.6
4
That domestic trademark owners and consumers should be
protected from deception and confusion is not at issue. What is
at issue, apart from legislative interpretation, is the means such
protection should take. Whatever means is adopted as national
policy, if the risk of confusion increases substantially through
the influx of gray market goods, equity dictates that gray mar-
ket goods importers should bear the increased costs of prevent-
ing deception, either through exclusion of parallel imports
entirely, or by covering the cost of ensuring that consumers are
informed of the particular product's condition before purchase.
The competition from parallel imports, as well as the dangers
from undisclosed imperfections, establish an obvious incentive
among domestic trademark owners to exclude gray market
goods. However, attempts through private litigation,6
5 industry
agreements," cartels and vertical restraints 7 have demon-
strated the difficulty and ineffectiveness of private means.
64. Parallel importation increases the risk that such confusion will occur. But see
FTC, supra note 26, at $5526 (Federal Trade Commission staff investigations of con-
sumer deception in connection with gray market goods "have not produced evidence
of substantial systematic deception" to date.).
65. Beyers, The Greying of American Trademarks: The Genuine Goods Exclusion
Act and the Incongruity of Customs Regulation 19 C.F.R. § 133.21, 54 FORDHAM L.
REV. 83, 110 (1985). The identities of gray market importers are often difficult to
ascertain, and legal remedies are limited to those named in the actions.
66. Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937
(1981).
67. Porsche, a company with significant gray market imports, announced plans to
abolish its traditional franchise system, but later reconsidered its plans after being
sued by the Porsche dealer association. See Lower-Priced Porsche Due for U.S. in
1986, AuTOMOTIVE NEWS, May 20, 1985, at 3; see also J. GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTEC-
TION AND PRACTICE § 9.01(4) (1985). Articles 85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty prohibit
granting of exclusive territorial trademark licenses.
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D. Private Remedy Enforcement Hurdles
Lack of manufacturer incentives,68 current application of an-
titrust,69 copyright,70 and trademark 7' laws, together with the
high cost of litigation in this particularly unsettled area of the
law allow arbitragers and gray market importers to satisfy con-
sumer demand with minimal threat of regulation.72
Consumers are likewise thwarted in their efforts at self-pro-
tection for the reason that, in the absence of conspicuous disclo-
sure, hidden imperfections or warranty exclusions are not
discovered until after the purchase. Where such disclosure is
not required, the rule of caveat emptor prevails, leaving una-
ware consumers little recourse.
These private remedy enforcement hurdles suggest a fourth
cause for the emergence of gray markets: ease of entry into the
domestic consumer market. The limited effectiveness of pri-
vate methods to control parallel imports exhibits the need for
external regulation. While this does not necessarily mandate
the conclusion that Congress, through Customs, should impose
a blanket exclusion to correct the inequities, private ineffec-
68. Manufacturers benefit by increases in overall sales. Thus, while Mercedes
makes efforts to discourage gray market imports through publicity and contracts with
financial and insurance institutions, it provides a delivery center, factory tours and
dining facilities for U.S. citizens buying their cars at the factory. See FTC, supra note
26, at S5530 (citing A Cheaper Way to Get the Goods, INSIGHT, Oct. 21, 1983, at 56). For
a discussion of the cost savings and advertising advantages to manufacturers from not
differentiating trademarks between countries, see Knoll, supra note 35, at 177-78.
69. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). In United States v. Guerlain,
Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), vacated, 358 U.S. 915 (1958), the court found that
the manufacturer's attempt to restrict the distribution system by using section 526 of
the Tarriff Act of 1930 amounted to an attempt to monopolize the market for its
perfumes.
70. The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 602 (1982), specifically allows the im-
portation of gray market goods. Id. at § 602(b). However, such importation consti-
tutes a copyright infringement unless consented to. Id. at § 602(a). Consent by the
overseas owner is deemed sufficient. See 17 U.S.C. § 602, Historical and Revision
Notes, HOUSE REPORT No. 94-1476.
71. The Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1982), bars the importation of for-
eign produced goods bearing a registered trademark without the U.S. trademark
owner's written consent, but has been held by Customs to apply only to imports man-
ufactured by an entity unrelated to the U.S. trademark owner. The Lanham Trade-
mark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1982), prohibits the importation of goods that
"copy or simulate a [registered] trademark," but has generally been applied only to
counterfeit goods.
72. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that "the law governing gray market
imports is inconsistent and in transition," as discussed in Mackintosh, Grey Market
Imports: Burgeoning Crisis or Emerging Policy, 11 N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 293,
295 (1986).
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tiveness poignantly demonstrates the current absence of mean-
ingful public regulation or private incentives directed at the
causes: adjustment lags to currency fluctuations, established
consumer demand for trademarked merchandise, lack of dis-
tributor incentives to disclose quality differences, limited verti-
cal control by trademark owners and unmet demand in
growing nontargeted market segments.
More precise regulation is needed to cure these symptoms of
unfair competition, fairly allocating the benefits of trademark
ownership and the burdens of consumer protection. Moreover,
the long-term public interest in upholding intellectual property
values should look beyond merely protective measures of law-
suits, private restraints and artificial barriers, and look instead
toward creating positive investments in quality, service, adver-
tising and growth. 3
E. Supply And Demand Of Nontargeted Market Segments
A direction of growth conspicuously overlooked in most par-
allel market analyses looms beyond traditional dealer net-
works.7 4 Domestic trademark owners have primarily built
goodwill with a clientele accustomed to shopping at "author-
ized" dealer showrooms, full-service retail establishments and
specialty boutiques, both willing and able to pay suggested re-
tail prices. 75 Domestic trademark owners and their dealers
have invested vast sums in market preparation and develop-
ment, organized dealer networks, published user literature, set
up training and repair centers, and branched out into a plethora
of brand-related products (car accessories, jackets, etc.) and ac-
tivities (clubs, seminars, travel).76 Despite this fact, substantial
demand lies on the edge of the consumer frontiers waiting to be
developed. 77
73. FTC, supra note 26, at S5527 ("Customs Service efforts to restrict gray market
imports would impose efficiency losses on the U.S. economy and higher prices on con-
sumers."). Taken alone, however, this fact ignores the legitimate problems of disin-
centive to invest in trademark quality created by free-riding, discussed in supra notes
35-48 and accompanying text.
74. See Caves & Williamson, What Is Product Differentiation, Really?, 24 J. IN-
DUS. ECON. 113 (1985).
75. See Heckscher, Parallel Imports Furore: A Case of Smoke Exhalation?, INT'L
Bus. LAw., Jan. 1987, at 32, 33. "They have acquired great respectability through their
judicious and pervasive use of American style advertising, and other forms of cus-
tomer education." Id.
76. Id.
77. Steiner, RPM, Distribution Restraints, and the Growth of Discounting: The
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Market analysts refer to "targeting market segments" as a
means of more effectively arousing consumer demand. The
technique involves research to identify customer groups called
"segments" (housewives, retired couples or young upwardly
mobile professionals, for instance), constructing a profile of
those customers' needs or desires (financial security, health or
romance, perhaps), and then appealing to those desires when
designing and promoting the particular products.78 The tech-
nique is effective because it aims at, or targets, a precise seg-
ment of the population. Gray marketers have capitalized on
this process by exploiting markets that had been previously ig-
nored by traditional retailers. 79 Lower wholesale costs and
overhead enable parallel importers to target these other con-
sumers by discounting below the dealer prices,8° or through
innovative techniques, incompatible with the traditional estab-
lished dealer image, which capture and develop new segments
of consumer demand. Catalogue showrooms, mail order
houses, factory outlets, multilevel direct distributors, sidewalk
vendors and electronic media such as cable TV shopping and
telephone marketing are among the contemporary alternatives
to traditional dealer networks.
This fact suggests a further cause for the emergence of gray
markets: failure in the established channels to develop or re-
spond to the growing demand potential outside the dealer mar-
ket segment."' Parallel importation increases competitive
incentives among both dealers and discounters to expand these
new consumer markets. Rather than infringe on domestic
trademark owners' goodwill, parallel importation in this con-
text facilitates increased trademarked product sales and eco-
nomic growth.
Importance of Vertical Competition, 15 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 73, 86 (1984). For
example, mail order services have brought new products to vast regions of small
towns. Id. See also supra note 51, at D4, col. 3 (Last year, in fact, discount shopping in
San Francisco was elevated to tourist attraction status when it was listed for the first
time in the San Francisco Convention & Visitors Bureau's Guide.).
78. For a general overview of market segmentation, see W. WENTZ, supra note 46,
at 266.
79. See T.R. Overstreet, Resale Price Maintenance: Economic Theories and Em-
pirical Evidence, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 25-32 (1983), and case studies de-
scribed at 106-60. See also M. ADELMAN, A & P: A STUDY IN PRICE-COST BEHAVIOR
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1959).
80. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert denied,
474 U.S. 1055 (1986).
81. See Mattioli, supra note 47, at 18 (characterizing full-service dealer establish-
ments as "dinosaurs").
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This particular expansion into new consumer markets carries
with it, however, an increased risk of deception. Electronic
marketing is far more difficult to monitor, and thus more sus-
ceptible to abuse. 2 Moreover, the practical effect at the border
of increased parallel importation is to increase the difficulty of
excluding counterfeits from entering the American market,"
infringing on legitimate trademarked product retailers, and de-
ceiving consumers with poor quality substitutes.8 "
To meet the counterfeit threat, Congress recently enacted
legislation which imposes criminal sanctions on persons im-
porting goods with a counterfeit trademark85 Congress explic-
itly indicated that this new statute did not apply to gray market
imports of authentic trademarked goods, nor was it intended to
"facilitate or enforce any system of resale price maintenance.""
Such enactments demonstrate incremental attempts to de-
fine more precise entry constraints. The need for a comprehen-
sive solution to the growing gray market malaise is more
apparent today than ever before.
82. Consumer recognition of trademark and price tags notwithstanding, details of
warranty differences and disclaimers, inherent defects, or simply cosmetic differences
which would only be apparent from examination or if fully set forth in accompanying
literature, are the type of explanations that do not lend themselves to thirty or sixty
second radio spots or television commercials and would be unreasonable to require or
enforce.
83. See S. 1671, supra note 18, at 11893 (remarks by Senator Hatch: "Gray market
channels of distribution attract counterfeiters, who can easily describe their product
as gray market goods. For example, counterfeit gray market goods abound in the fra-
grance and pharmaceutical industries.").
84. Higgins & Rubin, Counterfeit Goods, 29 J. L. & ECON. 211, 227 (1986). "There
may be substantial losses in consumer surplus as well-it is reported that, for exam-
ple, some women have become pregnant while taking counterfeit birth-control pills."
Id.
85. Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1502, 98 Stat. 2178
(1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a) (Supp. 1987)). Statutory penaltiesagainst individuals include fines up to $250,000 and imprisonment to a maximum of
five years for the first offense, and $1 million and 15 years imprisonment for repeat
offenders. Business may be fined up to $1 million for the first offense, and $5 million
for repeated violations.
86. S. REP. No. 526, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 449.
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II
Traditional "Symptom" Approaches Fail
to Isolate Causes
A. Historical Background
Congress and the courts permitted parallel imports without
restriction s  prior to a controversial appellate court decision in
1921, A. Bourioja & Co. v. Katzel. This case well illustrates the
symptoms that develop in the absence of meaningful entry con-
straints: domestic trademark rights lie exposed to infringe-
ment, while consumers enter the marketplace vulnerable to
confusion and deception. In this instance, problems arose after
a French manufacturer sold all its American trademark rights
in JAVA face powder to a U.S. distributor.
The French manufacturer and the U.S. distributor were sep-
arate and unrelated companies. The new domestic trademark
owner and exclusive distributor of JAVA sifted and recolored
the bulk powder, blending colors uniquely suitable to the
American market, repackaging it in new JAVA labeled boxes
which were made in America and specifically designed to culti-
vate American consumer demand and advertising itself as the
source of JAVA powder.8 9
Subsequently, another importer began purchasing prepack-
aged JAVA powder from the bulk manufacturer in France,
then shipping it into the United States and retailing it to Amer-
ican consumers under the same JAVA trademark. Consumers,
deceived by the JAVA trademark, expected domestic quality
and mistakenly purchased the foreign powder. The domestic
trademark owner sued for trademark infringement, but the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals held there was no cause of ac-
tion against the importer 0
The inherent inequity of this decision aroused both judicial
and congressional protectionist sentiment, prompting the
Supreme Court to reverse the decision91 and Congress to pass
87. See, e.g., Fred Gretsch Mfg. Co. v. Schoening, 238 F. 780 (2d Cir. 1916); Huny-
adi Janos Corp. v. Stoeger, 285 F. 861 (2d Cr. 1922).
88. 275 F. 539 (2d Cr. 1921), revg 274 F. Supp. 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1920).
89. Brief for Petitioner at 10, A. BourJois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1921) (No.
190).
90. 260 U.S. 689, 691 (1923).
91. 260 U.S. 689 (1923) (rev'g the Second Circuit, after section 526 of the Tariff Act
of 1922 was enacted, but without explicit reference to it).
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section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1922.2
Justice Holmes held that the imported French powder in-
fringed the U.S. trademark owner's exclusive right to that
mark because the actual significance of the JAVA trademark to
consumers was not its indication of origin, but the goodwill of
the domestic trademark owner.
9 3
The following year, the Court clarified the goodwill issue in
Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty," where the foreign manufacturer
of COTY cosmetics claimed trademark infringement by
Prestonettes for importing bulk COTY and retailing it in
smaller containers. Here, in contrast, Justice Holmes held that
Prestonettes could label its repackaged COTY as COTY and
distribute it in competition with the foreign manufacturer.95
The significance of the Coty decision is its emphasis on con-
sumer protection. It may further be distinguished from Katzel
by the fact that the plaintiff trademark owner was also the for-
eign manufacturer. These two contrasting opinions by Justice
Holmes demonstrate the intent of the Supreme Court to define
precise, meaningful entry constraints that would protect con-
sumers from confusion, and domestic trademark owners from
infringement.
Congress, unfortunately, was less precise. Section 526(a)
provides that "it shall be unlawful to import any merchandise
of foreign manufacture" bearing a trademark owned by a U.S.
citizen or corporation "created or organized within the United
States," without the consent of the U.S. trademark owner. 9
92. Section 526, proposed by four senators on the finance committee, was passed
by a vote of 44 to 15 as an amendment to the Tariff Bill of 1922, 62 CONG. REC. 11602-5
(1922), and enacted, 42 Stat. 975 (1922). The section was reconsidered by the Senate
seven years later, 71 CONG. REC. 3871-74 (1922), and reenacted without revision as
section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 741 (1930).
93. 260 U.S. at 691-92.
We are of the opinion that the plaintiff's rights are infringed. After the sale
the French manufacturers could not have come to the United States and
have used their marks in competition with the plaintiff. That plainly follows
from the statute authorizing assignments.... It is said that the trade mark
here is that of the French house and truly indicates the origin of the goods.
But that is not accurate.... It was sold and could only be sold with the good
will of the business that the plaintiff bought.
Is
94. 264 U.S. 359 (1924).
95. Id. at 368. "A trademark only gives the right to prohibit the use of It so far as
to protect the owner's good will against the sale of another's product as his." IM
96. 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982) (emphasis added).
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B. Current Debate
The focus of current debate in Congress," and ruled on by
the United States Supreme Court,9 centers on the meaning of
the broad language in this legislation.9 Customs has inter-
preted the statute' °° to protect only those domestic trademark
owners in a Katzel-type situation, unrelated to a foreign mul-
tinational manufacturing parent corporation.' 10
97. S. 1097, supra note 17, proposed by Senators Chafee and Rudman, would cod-
ify current Customs regulations permitting parallel importation of trademarked prod-
ucts when the domestic trademark owner is related to a multinational enterprise.
S. 1671, supra note 18, authored by Senator Hatch, would create a blanket exclusion
of parallel imports, with the narrow exceptions stated explicitly in the 1922 legislation
(domestic trademark owner permission, or personal use).
98. The decision on May 31, 1988, by a splintered majority in COPIAT III, supra
note 1, upheld the most significant provisions of a 50-year-old Customs Service regula-
tion of parallel imports as a permissible interpretation of Section 526 of the Tariff Act
of 1930.
The Court initially decided a preliminary jurisdictional issue, March 7, 1988, - U.S.
-, 108 S. Ct. 950 [COPIAT II], affirming in part the D.C. Circuit Court [COPIAT I],
and restoring the case to the calendar for reargument on the merits. Justice Brennan
held, in a 5-3 decision, that the Court of International Trade did not have exclusive
jurisdiction. Id at 956. The majority found that the district court properly took juris-
diction under both the general federal question provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and the
specific provision regarding actions "arising under any Act of Congress relating to...
trademarks." Id. at 951.
In COPAT III, Justice Anthony Kennedy, casting the deciding vote and writing the
lead opinion, was joined by Justice White in approving Customs' interpretation al-
lowing gray market imports. Justice Brennan concurred in a separate opinion, adopt-
ing different reasoning, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens. Justice Scalia wrote
the dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun and
O'Connor.
However, Justice Kennedy was joined by the dissenters in that portion of his opin-
ion which ruled that domestic companies that license independent foreign companies
to use their trademarks for sales overseas may prevent only gray market imports of
those particular goods into the United States.
99. The legislation was ostensibly proposed to prevent the sort of fraud that oc-
curred in Katzel. See 62 CONG. REc. 11,603 (1922). The Senate floor debate, however,
reveals a broader range of motives, including protection of purchasers of German
property which was seized in the United States during World War I and auctioned off
by the Alien Property Custodian to domestic subsidiaries such as Baer Co. of New
York. Id. at 11,604. In framing the discussion, the rules of statutory construction (as
to whether such debate should be properly considered) are themselves at issue. In
addition to the legislative history, it seems doubtful that the protectionist Congress of
1922 intended to protect foreign trademark owners at the expense of domestic
consumers.
100. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c) (1985).
101. Federal circuit courts of appeal split on upholding the Customs regulations
implemented to enforce section 526. In Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552
(Fed. Cir. 1985), the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied
Vivitar's arguments that Customs regulations be declared ultra vires, ruling that
while section 526 may provide transnational corporations a cause of action to restrict
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Opponents of parallel imports contend that the Customs reg-
ulations contravene the "plain language" of section 526, a stat-
ute so clear that it can be interpreted in only one way.1 2 "A
way," proponents argue, "which conflicts with five decades of
agency regulations, judicial decisions and executive pronounce-
ments which have construed section 526, despite its newly dis-
covered 'clarity,' in a different way."1
0 3
The significance of the Supreme Court's ruling of March 31,
1988, is fundamentally to apply a limited degree of precision to
the parallel import quandary. Blanket exclusion, like unregu-
lated entry, produces unnecessary negative side effects while
foreclosing numerous potential benefits for growth in the do-
mestic economy.104 Such crude tools have become obsolete in
light of the complexities of modern global commerce.
Unfortunately, neither of the alternative Senate proposals
inject any new hope into this dilemma. While codifying the
limited precision afforded in the Customs Service regulations,
the Chafee legislation'0 5 fails to address many of the causes of
gray market harms, such as consumer confusion, trademark in-
vestment incentives and import inspection burdens. Con-
versely, the Hatch proposal'0° would not only be a step
backward from the regulatory and judicial refinements of the
past six decades, but largely ignores the inherent market forces
which generate gray market demand.
To adequately protect consumers and domestic trademark
values while simultaneously preserving the business and con-
sumer benefits enjoyed- through parallel trading, precise entry
constraints must be directed at the root causes of the troubling
gray market imports, Customs is not required "sua sponte" to enforce the statute. Id.
at 1569-70.
A divided Second Circuit also upheld Customs regulations in Olympus Corp. v.
United States, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986), offiv 627 F. Supp. 911 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, however, held the Cus-
toms regulations to be contrary to the plain language of the statute (section 526).
COPAT I, supra note 12.
102. COPAT II, supra note 9, Brief for Respondents (Cartier, Inc., Charles of the
Ritz Group, Ltd., Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks) at 19.
For a listing of all 66 member companies see Addendum to Brief, 10a-lla.
103. COPIAT II, supra note 33, Brief for Petitioners (K Mart Corporation, 47th
Street Photo) at 9.
104. See supra notes 25-86 and accompanying text.
105. See S. 1097, supra note 17, at S5524 (introduced by Senator John Chaffee, R-
Rhode Island).
106. See S. 1671, supra note 18, at 11893 (introduced by Senator Orin Hatch, P-
Utah).
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symptoms: the market conditions that create the incentive for
parallel importation to develop and mature. The Supreme
Court'0 7 has taken responsibility to preserve the foundation es-
tablished by the legislature, as refined by Customs and the
courts. Congress should take the next step forward in eliminat-
ing the evils of consumer deception and business atrophy by
defining, with greater precision, guidelines for the regulation of
parallel imports in the nineties.
III
Effective Gray Market Solutions Must Harness
Market Forces
If the United States' public policy objective when regulating
the economy should be to enhance business development in so-
cially responsible ways, then the ultimate regulatory purpose
should be to maximize long run human welfare. 08 Toward this
end, workable approaches which regulate parallel importation
must balance the competing market forces that foster gray
market conditions and produce their negative and positive ef-
fects. This can best be accomplished by allowing arbitrage, re-
quiring full product quality and service disclosure, shifting the
cost of import and disclosure enforcement to the parallel im-
porters, facilitating incentives for increased trademark invest-
ment and targeting nontraditional consumer markets.
A. Arbitrage Benefits the Domestic Economy
Domestic interests are best served by allowing price competi-
tion within the international market.09 Closing domestic mar-
kets to the potential advantages of arbitraging currency
exchange rates is inefficient. It injures consumers and trans-
107. COPIAT III, supra note 1.
108. Where the national raison d'etre is to maximize individual welfare, It is axio-
matic that business welfare (including intellectual property values) should be chan-
neled toward that end. For a broad, economic policy discussion, see J. HURST, LAW
AND MARKETS IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 14-16 (1981) (citing Alexander .Hamilton,
Papers, 6:254-56 (1979)).
109. See Calvani Recognizes Importance of Global Competition in Analyzing Anti-
trust Issues, 49 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 888,890 (1985) (international com-
petition is desirable and should occur in an arena of free and fair trade); Acting FT
Chairman Terry Calvani and President Reagan Hold Fast Against Protectionism,
TIME, Oct. 7, 1985, at 22.
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fers profits overseas.110 Arbitrager efficiencies benefit domestic
consumers by allowing importers to capitalize on advantageous
exchange rate fluctuations, reducing wholesale costs which can
be passed on to the consumer at the retail level."' Public pol-
icy, therefore, should encourage arbitrage.
At present, every major U.S. trading partner, including Ja-
pan and the European Economic Commonwealth nations, per-
mits parallel importation,"' and thus gains domestic benefits of
international currency fluctuations. Moreover, the collateral
effect of billions of dollars in parallel imports, purchased in
rapid response to currency value changes, dampens exchange
rate fluctuations and their disruptive effect on international
industries."'
Maintaining Customs' regulatory interpretation by prohibit-
ing gray goods from unrelated entities preserves the existing
manufacturer incentives for quality control and investments in
market development, product service and trademark good-
will." 4 Where the American dealer and foreign manufacturer
are members of the same multinational corporate enterprise,
parallel importation should enhance investment incentives by
the foreign parent company to the extent that additional
production increases overall profits available for such
reinvestment."5
110. See FTC, supra note 26, at S5527. Price discrimination harms consumers and
transfers profits out of the U.S. economy.
111. Firms which are concerned with manufacture and distribution arrangements
are usually not as proficient in detecting and responding to exchange rate adjustment
situations. Id. at S5529 n.17. Gray markets improve consumer welfare by internation-
alizing markets.
112. Takamatsu, Parallel Importation of Trademarked Good& A Comparative
Analysis, 57 WASH. L. REV. 443 (1982) (Switzerland, Austria, the United Kingdom,
West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Sweden).
113. FTC, supra note 26, at S5529.
114. COPIAT II, Brief for Petitioners, supra note 33, at 38. "When the American
and foreign trademark owner are members of the same multinational corporate fam-
ily, there can be no 'American goodwill' separate from the global goodwill which the
foreign parent company has generated." Id,
115. See Lewin, supra note 43, at 239. COPLAT III, supra note 1, slightly modifies
existing Customs regulations which had prevented United States companies that li-
censed use of their trademarks for sales overseas to independent foreign companies
(as distinguished from foreign affiliates of domestic parent companies) from exclud-
ing those imports into the United States. The Court reasoned that such licensed dis-
tributors were not sufficiently related to be classified as members of the same
mulitnational enterprise. However, that portion of the gray market that the Court
struck down, was of "relatively little economic significance." N.Y. Times, June 1,
1988, at C6, col. 4. Nathan Lewin, attorney for 47th Street Photo, Inc., characterized
the new exclusion as "the very rare situation of an American trademark owner who
1122 [Vol. 10:I101
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B. Parallel Importers Should Bear Gray Market Burden
A policy aimed at securing the benefits of arbitrage through
parallel importation will increase Customs' screening and en-
forcement costs to the extent that such imports increase.
These costs would include product inspection through non-
dealer channels to verify trademark authenticity and exclude
counterfeits, packaging inspection to ensure conspicuous disclo-
sure of service or quality differences, and point-of-sale inspec-
tions to ensure compliance with these policy enactments.
116
Since parallel importers are the initial beneficiaries of a pol-
icy which encourages arbitrage, fairness dictates that they bear
any increased enforcement costs to properly administer this
benefit. At present, no mechanism exists to make sure free-
riders pay their way. Therefore, a gray goods import tax should
be imposed on all trademarked goods imported through paral-
lel channels."
7
Increased enforcement expenses should be relatively small
since Federal Trade Commission and Customs inspection pro-
cedures are already in place."' Thus, an adequate spending
budget tied to this revenue may reasonably be limited to one
percent of import value," 9 with subsequent adjustments as
authorizes an independent foreign manufacturer to affix the trademark to an item
made abroad." Some perfume manufacturers have done this. Id at col. 5.
116. See infra notes 123-32 and accompanying text.
117. See USITC TARIFF SCHEDULES OF THE UNITED STATES ANNOTATED, U.S. Gov-
ERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE (18th edition 1987) [hereinafter TSUSA] (United States
International Trade Commission [USITC] tariff schedules currently applied to im-
ported merchandise, published pursuant to the Tariff Classification Act of 1962, § 201,
together with statistical annotations formulated pursuant to the Tariff Act of 1930,
§ 1484(e)). TSUSA indicates that 19 U.S.C. § 1484(e) as amended, authorizes and di-
rects the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, and the United
States International Trade Commission "to establish from time to time ... (an]
enumeration of articles in such detail as in their judgment may be necessary .... All
import entries ... shall include or have attached thereto an accurate statement speci-
fying... the kinds and quantities of all merchandise imported... and the value of the
total quantity." Id. at III n.2.
118. Id. at 11. "The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to prescribe methods of
analyzing, testing, sampling, weighing, gauging, measuring, or other methods of ascer-
tainment whenever he finds that such methods are necessary to determine the physi-
cal, chemical, or other properties or characteristics of articles for purposes of any law
administered by the Customs Service." Id.
119. Tariffs imposed on all imports from "class 1" countries (i.e. independent non-
communist countries without "special" or developing country status) are generally
minimal at present. d at 4. For example, watches range from five to seven-and-one-
half percent ad val. Id. at 7-50 through 7-59. Cameras range from three to five percent
ad val. Id. at 7-60, 7-61. Automobile trucks pay 25% ad val. Id. at 9-25. However, cer-
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Congress deems appropriate to cover costs.
Establishing a gray goods import tax provides a mechanism
whereby parallel importers pay their way. The import "prefer-
ence" enjoyed by "authorized" dealers exempted from the tax
creates a degree of investment incentive for domestic trade-
mark owners by protecting an additional one percent margin
over cost,' ° while allowance of gray imports is an incentive for
authorized dealers to direct that investment toward differenti-
ating their product in their marketing strategies by advertising
on the basis of quality, service, image, convenience, location or
the comfortable facility environment. Moreover, consumers
will benefit from wider selection and lower prices afforded
through parallel imports. However, because of the risks of
counterfeits and deception attendant parallel imports, a
method to eliminate these present harms must be established.
A public policy aimed at consumer and trademark value protec-
tion must incorporate enhanced counterfeit screening'2 ' and
better access to information.'
C. Quality Disclosure Facilitates Access To Information
Trademark values and consumer interests are best protected
by a policy aimed at facilitating access to product and service
tain products of Japan (microprocessor based mechanisms, rotary power tools, color
TVs) are listed at 100% ad val. Id. at 9-26.
Under the proposed recommendations of this Note, an additional one percent ad
val. would be collected on all gray goods permitted entry in accordance with Customs
regulations as modified by the Supreme Court in COPLAT III, supra note 1. Since this
amount is commensurate with existing tariffs, it will not unduly burden parallel im-
porters so as to discourage gray goods entry, and at the same time, it will generate
additional revenue to sustain the additional enforcement burdens. See ii 1fr notes
125-32 and accompanying text.
120. The impact of a one percent Investment incentive can be most appreciated if
understood in comparison to the percentage of total sales which businesses typically
invest in advertising. According to most empirical studies on product promotion ex-
penditures, the median amount reinvested by retailers on advertising is approxi-
mately two percent of total sales. See, e.g., Schonfeld & Associates, Inc., Estimates of
Average Advertising to Sales and Advertising to Gross Profit Margin by Industry,
ADVERTISING AGE, Sept. 18, 1978, at 56. For a more in-depth analysis, see W. WENTz,
supra note 46, at 26& The competitive advantage made available by taxing gray mar-
ket imports allows authorized dealers the opportunity to maintain profit margins and
increase typical advertising budgets significantly in order to differentiate themselves
from the discounters.
121. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
122. See infra notes 123-32 and accompanying text.
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information.123 Consumer choice is obviously not served by
price and quality differentiation if those quality differences are
not disclosed. However, parallel importers lack sufficient mar-
ket incentives to increase consumer protection and aware-
ness.' Therefore, disclosure of product quality and service
disparities in gray market goods should be made mandatory
and rigorously enforced.'2
Parallel imports of trademarked "seconds" and diverted
products designed to foreign specifications should be clearly
identified. A tag, wrapper, or label should be conspicuously af-
fixed, disclosing quality grade, compatibility with U.S. broad-
cast frequencies and electrical currents. Products designed to
specifications below required U.S. safety or environmental
standards should not be permitted entry without an importer
bond,l 26 guaranteeing conforming adjustments before retail.
Retailers of gray market goods should be required to provide
local market language instructions' (English in most cases,
but Spanish or Chinese where appropriate), and point-of-sale
disclosure of purchaser eligibility for manufacturer rebate, ser-
vice and warranty coverage. 2' Gray market retail advertising
should be required to comply with all import disclosures set
123. FTC, supra note 26, at S5526. The generally preferred solution is to make
sure that consumers have access to information about material differences. Id
124. See Akerlof, supra note 58, at 488-90.
125. See TSUSA, supra note 117, at 7-47(i). The Secretaries are authorized to issue
enforcement regulations. Entries made not in accordance with applicable regulations
"shall be subject to the applicable civil remedies and criminal sanctions, and, in addi-
tion, the Secretaries may cancel or restrict the license or certificate of any manufac-
turer found in willful violation of the regulations." Id.
126. The bond would apply to all nonconforming products, including, for instance,
automobiles which fall below the established standards in the state of entry or desti-
nation. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
127. Recently enacted California legislation requires disclosure if the accompany-
ing instructions are not in English (disclosure in English, presumably). See Assembly
Bill No. 5971, supra note 14. While this would alert English speaking consumers to
the likely inability to comprehend operating and safety guidelines, it does nothing to
protect the consumers on whose behalf such instructions are provided. Requiring the
retailer to supply local language instructions would protect consumers. It would also
place an incentive on manufacturers to incorporate multilanguage instructions, since
the manufacturer could do so more efficiently. Ideally, "authorized" dealers should
be held to the same standard. Where instruction manuals included with products
through "authorized" dealers are not required by federal, state or local law to be pro-
vided in the local language, gray market retailers should likewise be exempt from this
provision.
128. Pursuant to the Federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Federal Trade Commis-
sion Improvement Act, 16 C.F.R. § 702.3 (1988), Federal Trade Commission regula-
tions currently require retailers to provide pre-sale written warranties. Id
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forth above. A retailer who violates these provisions should be
liable to the purchaser who returns the product for a refund or
credit,'2 as well as to the domestic trademark owner for unfair
competition,'-s and subject to a fine for deceptive practices.'
3 '
Mandatory disclosure will naturally protect domestic intel-
lectual property values from degradation and infringement by
strengthening consumer confidence in trademarked products.
It will also bolster dealer reputations for quality and service by
forcing discounters to differentiate gray' goods in advertising.
Requiring labels or wrappers on all manufacturer "seconds"
will increase consumer access to information while maintaining
domestic trademark owner and dealer goodwill because cus-
tomer confidence in the quality of the trademark will be pro-
tected. Enforcing point-of-sale warranty disclosures will avoid
consumer confusion and provide additional incentive for dis-
count distributors to offer substitute services. 32 Furthermore,
requiring that instructions be provided in the language of the
predominant local retail customer will provide better consumer
protection and awareness as well as protect trademark owners'
goodwill and provide manufacturer incentive to print multi-
language instructions.
D. Competition Fosters Trademark Investment and Control
Domestic trademark owners interested in preserving public
perceptions of trademark, high quality, and maintaining retail
prices or contracting for locally exclusive distribution are natu-
rally threatened by parallel importation. While mandatory dis-
closure of quality differences provides goodwill protection by
maintaining consumer confidence in the quality of the trade-
marked products available through "authorized" dealers, it
129. Both the California and New York enactments provide for retailer liability to
the purchaser if the returned product has not been used in a manner inconsistent with
any printed instruction provided by the seller. See supra notes 14-15.
130. In California, section 17200 of the Business and Professions Code and section
1770 of the Civil Code provide for remedies to compensate victims of unfair competi-
tion or deceptive practices. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 1988); CAL. Civ.
CODE § 1770 (West 1988).
131. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act already vests the Commission
with authority to intervene where gray market imports deceive the customer. See
FTC, supra note 26, at S5528.
132. Many discounters are beginning to offer their own warranties and repair ser-
vice. See Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Wal-
ton, Antitrust, RPM and Big Brands: Discounting in Small-Town America (pt. 2), 15
ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REv. 11, 12-13 (1983).
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does little to control competition or protect dealer exclusivity.
At present, however, manufacturers and retailers underutilize
private contract approaches.'ls Therefore, a policy with pur-
poses including the protection of intellectual property values
must take into account the impact of parallel importation on
private trademark investment incentives.
Allowing parallel importation provides manufacturers inter-
ested in maintaining trademark uniformity an incentive to im-
prove quality control. Rather than have Customs inspect for
"seconds" labels, such manufacturers will be more likely to
repair, demark, or destroy imperfect products in order to main-
tain an image of consistent quality.134 Allowing parallel impor-
tation will, therefore, encourage improved quality control.
Manufacturers interested in enforcing vertical restraints' 35
will similarly have an incentive to structure foreign distributor
contracts with more control through shorter terms, resale re-
strictions, and revocable-at-will clauses.'M Rather than having
those trademarked products designed to foreign specifications
diverted to compete with dealer models, manufacturers will be
more likely to discipline foreign dealers engaged in gray mar-
ket sales. 137
At the same time, manufacturers most interested in increas-
ing overall output will benefit by the increased sales resulting
from parallel imports, and will have an incentive to incorporate
investments in trademark values into the wholesale price
structure.38
Allowing parallel importation further provides an incentive
for retail dealers, not only to market their superior quality or
service, but to demand manufacturer support in such market-
133. See FTC, supra note 26, at S5528 (modest manufacturer efforts to curtail gray
markets).
134. Sears & Roebuck stores, for instance, offer only "clearance" sales, but main-
tain and market no supply of "second" quality merchandise through a "bargain base-
ment." See supra notes 49-67 and accompanying text.
135. Vertical restraints operate as a form of price/sales "discipline" exercised by
producers on the intermediaries between the manufacturer and the consumer. Also
called "channel integration," this practice is severely restrained via prevailing anti-
trust laws. See W. WENTZ, supra note 46, at 177.
136. For a discussion of practitioner approaches to strengthening vertical corporate
structures in an era of gray market importation see Gerber & Bender, The Gray Mar-
ket" A Legal Enigma, N.Y. ST. B.J., Jan. 1987, at 41.
137. See FTC, supra note 26, at S5527 (restrictions on gray market imports could
harm consumers by disrupting manufacturers' efforts to discipline retailers).
138. See Lewin, supra note 43, at 239.
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ing.x  Whether interested in maintaining uniform quality per-
ceptions, enforcing vertical control, or expanding overall
output, regulated parallel importation will increase manufac-
turer incentive to invest in trademark values.
E. Targeting New Consumer Markets Strengthens the Economy
Assuming the public interest is best served by the socially
responsible development of business enterprises, a policy al-
lowing parallel importation with full disclosure achieves the
public purpose which encourages fair price competition and
growth of new markets. Traditional dealer channels artificially
limit consumer access by discouraging intrabrand competition
and supporting surplus profit margins.14° Therefore, public pol-
icy should facilitate the growth of domestic gray markets.'
Parallel imports expand domestic markets by making trade-
mark products available to purchasers unwilling to buy at
dealer prices.142 By offering lower prices, discounters foster in-
trabrand competition and offer consumers additional choices of
degrees in quality and services coverage. This additional mar-
ket segmenting, differentiating product demand between cus-
tomers who want more service, quality assurances or lower
prices, results in better demand data for business managers and
allows for more effective promotional targeting based on con-
sumer choice.143
Since dealer marketing is typically directed at showroom,
full-service preferences,'" gray marketing through non-tradi-
tional distribution techniques makes products available to new
domestic markets, such as mail order, electronic telemarketing
and direct sales. Moreover, by developing new markets, gray
marketers are able to capture sales without eroding domestic
trademark owners' established markets, thereby increasing
overall sales.
139. Walton, Antitrust, RPM, and the Big Brands: Discounting in Small Town
America (pt. 1), 14 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 81, 99-100 (1982).
140. See Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937
(1981).
141. The Robinson-Patman Act bars price discrimination that is not cost-justified.
See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 578
(2d ed. 1980).
142. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
143. Better targeting results in increased consumer responsiveness through more
effective advertising. See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
144. See Heckscher, supra note 75, at 32.
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Increased overall sales eventually lower prices by generating
economies of scale 145 which facilitate more efficient means of
reduction, lowering costs which can be passed on to the con-
sumer in the form of lower prices. Lower retail prices further
increase demand, inducing greater production, and, ultimately,
increased employment. Facilitating parallel importation in this
context promotes the public policy goal of enhancing business
development.
Conclusion
Significant harms attend both the unrestrained influx of par-
allel imports, as well as their blanket exclusion. At the heart of
modern global commerce undulate market conditions which ig-
nite and perpetuate gray market demand. These conditions
cannot be ignored when shaping workable national policies.
The goal in taming a restless gray market environment
should be to capture the benefits of parallel import (lower
prices, wider choices and new market development), while ef-
fectively eliminating the dangers such as free-riding, confusion
and trademark degradation--and do so by means which fairly
allocate the policy burdens to those who enjoy the benefits.
Such an ideal solution can only be achieved by recognizing
the economic conditions which spawn gray markets, harnessing
the market force which generates the symptoms, and regulat-
ing the product flow with meaningful precision. This may best
be accomplished by encouraging arbitrage, requiring full prod-
uct quality and service disclosure, shifting the cost of import
and disclosure enforcement to the parallel importers, facilitat-
ing incentives for increased trademark investment and target-
ing non-traditional consumer markets.
145. Economists refer to "economies of scale" to describe the added efficiencies
available to large operations which can utilize the same manufacturing facilities al-
ready in place for meeting current production demands to produce extra products, the
only increased costs being the additional raw material and labor, in addition to a mar-
ginal amount of increase in equipment operation wear and tear.
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